Volume 42

Issue 3

Article 3

April 1936

Splitting the Cause of Action before a Justice--The Strange Case
of Bane v. Wilson
Robert T. Donley
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert T. Donley, Splitting the Cause of Action before a Justice--The Strange Case of Bane v. Wilson, 42 W.
Va. L. Rev. (1936).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol42/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Donley: Splitting the Cause of Action before a Justice--The Strange Case
SPLITTING THE CAUSE OF ACTION BEFORE A JUSTICETHE STRANGE CASE OF BANE V. WILSON
ROBERT T. DONLEY*

In these days of turbulent controversy over the federal constitution one must offer prayers of forgiveness or at least an
apology for venturing upon a discussion of an apparently innocuous
provision of his state constitution, limiting the jurisdiction of a
justice of the peace to claims involving $300 or less. When, however, such provision is made the foundation of a superstructure of
law running counter to propositions which one had hitherto supposed settled and sound, an excuse, if not a justification for comment ma'y be found. The recent case of Bane v. Wilson' furnishes
the material for such a discussion. The facts were thus: Wilson
was indebted to the Farmers Bank2 upon two notes in the sum of
$2,000 and $800, representing indebtedness incurred in 1920 and
1925 respectively. In January, 1933, Wilson executed to the bank
ten notes of $280 each. Upon learning that plaintiff, as receiver
of an insolvent bank, was instituting action in the circuit court
against Wilson to recover upon a capital stock assessment, the
Farmers Bank immediately instituted suit before a justice of the
peace upon the ten notes. On February 3, 1933, Wilson confessed
judgment. Plaintiff proceeded with his action in the circuit court
and recovered judgment on March 28, 1933. At May Rules, 1933,
plaintiff instituted the present suit in chancery, attacking the
judgments rendered by the justice of the peace. Upon further
proceedings therein, the circuit court held that these judgments
were void and did not constitute a lien upon the real estate of
Wilson. It further appeared that at the time of confessing the
ten judgments, Wilson was insolvent and that the arrangement
was made for the purpose of enabling the Farmers Bank to
secure judgments prior to that of plaintiff.
The Supreme Court of Appeals upheld this decision upon the
ground that "a justice of the peace in this state cannot, under
any pretext of acquiescence of the parties, acquire jurisdiction
beyond $300."
The case suggests the propriety of a discussion of at least three
* Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University. Member of the
Monongalia County Bar.
1182 S. E. 678 (W. Va. 1936).
2 Wilson was also indebted to other defendants. For purposes of simplification those rights are not discussed, the facts as above stated being sufficient to present the problem.
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problems: (1) discharge of a pre-existing debt by the acceptance
of promissory notes; (2) the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace;
and (3) the status of the judgments. These problems will be
discussed in the order named.
The original indebtedness of Wilson to the Farmers Bank,
represented by the notes for $2,000 and $800 was admittedly
valid. What, then, was the effect of substituting in lieu thereof
ten notes for $280? From the earliest days of the Supreme Court
of Appeals, it has been held that parties may make such a substitution, and that the effect thereof is a discharge of the old obligation,
if it be so expressly agreed.3 The presumption, however, is that
when the new note is between the same parties, a discharge of the
old obligation was not intended.4 On the contrary, if the new
note is that of a person not previously bound, surrender of the
old note, will primav facie be treated as a discharge of the old indebtedness.' Retention by the creditor of the old note is a circumstance (not amounting to a presumption) indicating an intent
that it was not to be discharged.6 It is perhaps not material
whether such discharge be regarded as an accord,7 as an accord
which is itself accepted in satisfaction of the pre-existing obligation,8 or as a merger.9
3 Lazier v. Nevin, 3 W. Va. 622 (1869); Miller v. Miller, 8 W. Va. 542
(1875); Poole v. Rice, 9 W. Va. 73 (1876); Dunlap's Ex'rs v. Shanklin, 10
W. Va. 662 (1877); Stephenson v. Rice, 12 W. Va. 575 (1878); Feamster v.
Withrow, 12 W. Va. 611 (1878); Bants & Co. v. Basnett, 12 W. Va. 773
(1878); Bowyer v. Knapp, 15 W. Va. 277 (1879); Sayre v. King, 17 W. Va.
562 (1880); Bank v. Good, 21 W. Va. 455 (1883); Hess v. Dille, 23 W. Va.
90 (1883); Moore v. Johnson, 34 W. Va. 672, 12 S.E. 918 (1891); Hull's
Adm'r v. Hull's Heirs, 35 W. Va. 155, 13 S. E. 49 (1891) ; Wolf v. McGugin,
37 W. Va. 552, 16 S. E. 797 (1893); Mansfield v. Dameron, 42 W. Va. 794,
26 S. E. 527 (1896); Cushwa v. Improvement L. & B. Ass'n, 45 W. Va. 490,
32 S.E. 259 (1898); Crim v. England, 46 W. Va. 480, 33 S.E. 310 (1899);
Lawson v. Zinn, 48 W. Va. 312, 37 S.E. 612 (1900); Bank v. Handley, 48
W. Va. 690, 37 S.E. 536 (1900); Ritchie County Bank v. Bee, 62 W. Va.
457, 59 S. E. 181 (1907); Acme Food Company v. Older, 64 W. Va. 255, 61
S. E. 235 (1908); Lowther v. Lowther-Kaufmann Oil, etc. Co., 75 W. Va.
171, 83 S.E. 49 (1914); Wyoming County Bank v. Nichols, 101 W. Va. 553,
133 S.E. 129 (1926). See collection of cases in (1928) 52 A. L. R. 1416.
4 Moore v. Johnson, supra n. 3.

rIbid.

6 Bank v. Good, supra n. 3.
7 RESTATE1ENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 417 (b): "If
the debtor breaks such
a contract the creditor has alternative rights. He can enforce either the
original duty or the subsequent contract."
8 Ibid. § 418: 1rA subsequent contract may itself be accepted as immediate
satisfaction and discharge of pre-existing contractual duty, or duty to make
compensation; and if so accepted the pre-existing duty is discharged and is
not revived by the debtor's breach of the subsequent contract."
0Ibid. § 448: "A contractual duty based on an unsealed contract, or a
duty to make compensation for breach of either a sealed or unsealed contract
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While it was not pleaded in the Bane case that the Farmers
Bank and Wilson agreed that the ten new notes should be accepted
in satisfaction of the two old notes, such as agreement, in all probability, would not have affected the decision. It is arguable,
of course, that in such ease the Farmers Bank should be able to
enforce the new notes to the same extent that it could have enforced them had they been given 'for any other valid consideration.
Undoubtedly, the discharge of the two old notes would constitute
a gocd consideration to support the ten new ones, and as between
the parties the court will not ordinarily inquire into the adequacy of
that consideration. Upon the other hand, in the absence of such an
agreement of discharge, the new notes are valid and enforceable, at
least by action in the circuit court, although the creditor would probably be required to produce and surrender the old notes before the
entering of judgment. Since, however, the Supreme Court did
not hold that the new notes were invalid, the foregoing discussion
becomes pertinent only to the extent of indicating that in other
cases the court might inquire into the consideration. For example,
suppose that the original loan of $2,800 had been in the first instance evidenced by ten notes for $280 each, being so drawn for
the express purpose of permitting the bank to obtain speedy
action before a justice of the peace. The prevalence of this practice in the commercial world is too well-known to require discussion. If the implications of the present case are followed to
their logical conclusion it would seem that such an arrangement
may be similarly condemned. No logical or realistic distinction
can be made between (a) ten notes, the consideration for which is
the present loan of money, and (b) ten notes, the consideration
for which is the present discharge of a pre-existing obligation.
The distinction apparently made by the court is that in the latter
case there is a "splitting" of a cause of action. This involves
the assumption that such cause of action was in existence at the
time when suit was brought before the justice, otherwise there
would be nothing to be split. This is clearly a non sequitur if
the original cause of action has been discharged. Again, suppose
that A commits a tort against B, and the parties agree that B's
damages amount to $500. A, being financially unable to make
payment in cash, offers to execute his note for $500. B states that
he will accept two notes for $250 each, in order that he may sue
is discharged by a negotiable instrument made by the party subject to the
duty and promising performance of it, if given as full satisfaction by him
and accepted as such by the party entitled to performance."
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upon them before a justice in the event of non-payment. The
parties so agree and the two notes are executed, in return for which
B executes to A a sealed release of all damages arising out of the
tort. The logic of the Bane case would require a holding that B
cannot recover upon these notes in an action before a justice. The
number and variety of such examples is limited only by the powers
of imagination, yet it would seem that such accords so accepted in
satisfaction should in all cases be upheld.
The Jurisdiction of a Justice of the Peace
In deciding the Bane case, the court said that "According
to our decisions, a debt, in its inception in excess of the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, may not be split into particles for
the mere purpose of obtaining jurisdiction before a justice of
claims exceeding $300."
Certain cases were cited in support of
this proposition.10 It is now proposed to examine those cases in
order to determine to what extent, if any, they are controlling
as applied to the facts under consideration.
In the Hugheston case, "1' one Hodges had been employed by
the plaintiff for a number of years. He resigned his position and
thereafter brought nine separate suits against plaintiff before a
justice of the peace, eight of them for $175 each and the other for
$295. Judgment was rendered in the last action for $195 and
plaintiff thereupon pleaded the same as res judicata to the other
eight actions. The case then proceeded by writ of prohibition
upon the ground that Hodges' demand was one indivisible claim
for arrearages of salary. Hodges answered that his salary was
$175 per month and that each of the first eight suits was for one
month's salary and the last suit was for salary for the period from
March 9th to May 1st, 1934. It was held that a demand for salary
accruing under a single contract of employment, although payable
monthly, is an indivisible claim and cannot be split into separate
demands for the monthly instalments. Conceding the correctness
of the assumption that Hodges had but one claim of $1,695,12 the
case is undoubtedly sound, but it is not authority for the
proposition that plaintiff and Hodges could not have substituted
2o Hugheston Gas Coal Corporation v. Hamilton, 181 S. E. 549 (W. Va.
1935) ; Cline v. Comer, 108 W. Va. 78, 150 S. E. 229 (1929) ; Rosenbloom and
Co. v. Russ, 103 W. Va. 203, 136 S. E. 846 (1927); Clay v. Meadows, 100 W.
Va. 487, 130 S. E. 656 (1925).
11 Supra n. 10.
12 Qu err: Why could not Hodges have recovered in a separate action at
the end of each month for that month's wages?
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promissory notes for the monthly instalments so that separate
actions thereon could be maintained before a justice.
In Cline v. Comer," the defendant, Comer, had from time to
time made loans, each less than $300, to his father and mother.
Thereafter, he secured from them a note in the sum of $1,551.77
"with a view (as the evidence discloses) of recovering judgment
immediately for these loans." Later, Corner's attorney secured
from the father and mother a series of five notes, each under $300,
for the purpose of recovering judgment thereon before a justice.
Judgment was rendered in May, 1926. In February, 1927, the
plaintiff, a subsequent judgment creditor of the father and mother,
instituted suit in chancery for the purpose of setting aside the
five judgments upon the ground that they had been obtained for
the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding creditors. Relief was denied. The court finding that there had been no fraud,
and that since the loans as originally made to the father and
mother were in sums less than $300 each, there was no objection
to combining them into notes. The effect of Corner's acceptance
of the note for $1,551.77 was entirely disregarded. Rather than
being an authority in support of the instant case, it is arguable
contra, that the note for $1,551.77 was a merger and consolidation
of the pre-existing loans, or at least prima facie taken in satisfaction thereof since it involved the taking of a higher and better
form of indebtedness. 14 If such is the correct view it would be
difficult, if not impossible to distinguish it from the instant case.
At any rate, it can hardly be cited in support of the proposition
that the original cause of action cannot be split.
The Rosenbloom case 1 is, on its facts, very similar to Cline v.
Comer, except that there was no evidence to show the amount of
the loans as originally made by the son to his father and mother.
The judgments were obtained by the defendant son before a
justice, pending a motion for judgment in the circuit court upon
the plaintiff's claim against the father and mother. It is to be
observed that the opinion in this case does not even mention the
point as to the jurisdiction of a justice, nor the question of splitting a cause of action, for which it is cited in the Bane case.
Consequently, it cannot be regarded as authority thereon.
S3Supra n. 10.

14 Cf. M Guire v. Gadsby, 3 Call 234 (Va. 1802).

Roane, J., said:

"*..

in order to make one instrument an extinguishment of another, the latter must
be of a higher dignity than the former, or must put the plaintiff in a better
condition."
15 Supra n. 10.
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In Clay v. Meadows,'- the plaintiff sold defendant several
bills of flour from time to time, totaling $498.50. Thereafter,
plaintiff brought two suits against defendant, before a justice, one
for $276 for part of these bills, and the other for the remainder.
It was held that each sale of flour should be treated as a separate
demand, maturing at different times, and that the terms of credit
having expired plaintiff could combine as many as possible into
units of not more than $300 and maintain separate suits thereon
before a justice. This case, again, is not authority for the proposition for which it was cited.
Continuing its discussion in the Bane case, the court said that
"The only way that one having a claim under contract for more
than $300 may get jurisdiction before a justice is by releasing part
of it and declaring on a less sum." The case of Richmond v. Henderson117 was cited in support of this statement. There, the plaintiff sued before a justice, claiming $300 damages, and filed two
bills of particulars, one setting up a breach of a written contract
and the other a claim for work and labor in performing services on
the defendant's land. Judge Brannon said that while the plaintiff
might be required to elect upon which bill of particulars he would
proceed, this point had nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the
justice. Or, assuming that the plaintiff could not be required so
to elect, he might prove both causes of action if he recovered on
both together not more than $300, waiving the excess. The defendant could not complain for the reason that he would not be injured. The case does not hold, nor does the opinion state the
proposition for which it is cited in the Bane case.
If then, the foregoing cases did not constitute binding authorities upon the question, nor, it is submitted, even persuasive
authority, and none having been found, the proposition is open
for discussion upon principle.
What was the purpose of the constitutional provision 8 that
"in suits to recover money or damages, their [justices of the peace]
jurisdiction and powers shall in no case exceed three hundred dollars"? One can conceive of many reasons: justices are not trained
lawyers and should properly be confined to the disposition of relatively trivial claims. Enlargement of jurisdiction would tend
to encroach upon the jurisdiction of the circuit court, of which it
is presumably jealous. The machinery and personnel of the jus'a Ibid.
17 48 W. Va. 389, 37 S. E. 653 (1900).
18 W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 28. W. VA. REV. CoDE (1931) e. 50, art. 2,
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tice's court is not well adapted to obtaining satisfaction of large
judgments. Whatever the true -object which the Constitutiondrafters had in view, it is submitted that it will be subserved so
long as justices are not p~rnitted to deal in any one case with
matters which would result in a judgment in excess of $300, nor
to re-try the same case. It should be noted that no restriction is
placed upon the number of claims upon which a justice may render
judgment. Again, the constitutional provision: does not purport
to prohibit the splitting of causes of action except in so far as that
may constitute a shift or device for enabling justices to deal with
claims involving more than $300. It would seem, however, that the
objection to splitting a cause of action is based not so much upon
constitutional necessity as upon the policy of the law to discourage litigation, multiplicity of suits and consequent vexation of the
defendant. 9 These considerations of policy are not constitutional
guarantees which the defendant may not waive."0 Prior to the
adoption of the 1931 Code, the plaintiff was required to combine
in one action all his claims against the defendant or be forever
barred from recovering upon those not included.21 Under the
1931 Code provisions22 no penalty is imposed save the denial of
recovery of costs. Whether the matter be one of joinder of causes
of action or of splitting them, in either case the objection from
the standpoint of public policy would appear to be the same, viz.,
protection of the defendant from multiple litigation. It is submitted, therefore, that a clear distinction should be made between
questions of constitutionality and questions of public policy as expressed in legislative enactments. Public policy, independently of
the Constitution, fully accounts for the doctrine forbidding the
splitting of the cause of action. The latter purports to deal only
with jurisdiction: the power to hear and determine causes; not
with the immunity of the defendant from vexatious and repeated
actions. This is not to say, of course, that if A is entitled to recover $900 from B arising either from the commission of a tort
or from breach of a contract, the parties can by consent confer
jurisdiction upon a justice to dispose of the case, by bringing three
19 See remarks of Miller, J., in Pocahontas Wholesale Groc. Co. v. Gillespie,
63 W. Va. 578, 581, 60 S. E. 597 (1908).
20 Cf. Bodley v. Archibald, 33 W. Va. 229, 10 S. E. 392 (1889), holding
that joint obligees of a debt in the sum of $600 could not, without the conent
of the debtor, divide it among themselves into several debts each under $300
and each sue thereon before a justice. (Italics by the Court). McDowell
County Bank v. Wood, 60 W. Va. 617, 55 S. E. 753 (1906).
21 W. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923), c. 50, § 48.
22 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 50, art. 4, § 18.
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suits each for $300. Such suits would not be the assertion of three
causes of action, but of one, and any other construction would
obliterate the constitutional provision. Thus, the point of distinction here suggested turns upon the status of the plaintiff's case
at the time of the institution of his suit. If it is then one cause
of action in excess of $300 no splitting should be permitted. If
they are then separate causes of action the doctrine against splitting has no application for the reason that no larger claim is in
existence which is susceptible of division.
The Status and Effect of the Judgment
In the Bane case an indeterminate amount of emphasis is
placed upon the fact that the execution of the ten notes was for
the purpose 23 of enabling the bank to sue upon them before a
justice. As previously stated, it is submitted that, as between the
immediate parties, the point presents no ground of differentiation.
It becomes important only in so far as it may be evidence of a
fraudulent conveyance or charge upon the real estate of Wilson.
If the ten judgments are absolutely void they create no lien upon
that real estate nor do they have the effect of operating as an
assignment for the benefit of all Wilson's creditors. The result is
that plaintiff's judgment rendered in the circuit court constitutes a lien which must be paid in full before the Farmers Bank
may participate in the proceeds of sale of the land.
This result, it is submitted, is contrary both to principle and to
authority. The bona fides of the original notes for $2,000 and $800
being admitted, and secondly, the validity of the ten new notes
not being questioned, the Farmers Bank was plainly in the position
of a creditor entitled to acquire preferential advantage from its
debtor in such manner and to such extent as the law permits any
other creditor. That the debtor is insolvent is of no consequence,
the preference being perfectly valid if not attacked by other
creditors by suit in chancery within the statutory period of limitation.24 Thus, Wilson might have conveyed the real estate to the
bank by absolute deed in satisfaction of his debts, or he might
23 Several beorgia cases have held that it is permissible for the debtor and
creditor to divide a large debt into smaller sums for the purpose of bringing
suits before a justice, and that the fact that such action was taken for the
purpose of preferring the creditor does not establish a case of fraud and collusion. Andrews & Co. v. Kaufmans, 60 Ga. 669 (1878) and cases therein
cited. The effect of a code provision upon these decisions is not clear.
Cf. Cline v. Comer, supra n. 10, where the facts showed that the small notes
were executed for the purpose of permitting suit before a justice.
24 W. VA. BEy. CoDE (1931)

c. 40, art. 1, § 5.
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have executed a deed of trust as security therefor. And, since a
judgment consitutes a lien upon all the lands of the debtor, he
might have confessed judgment in the circuit court, and thereby
have given security. Ever since the cases of Mack v. Prince" and
of Nuzum v. Herron,26 it has been undisputed that such a confessed
judgment operates as an assignment of all the real estate of the
judgment debtor, for the benefit of all his creditors, which, if not
set aside in the statutory manner, constitutes a valid preference
in favor of the judgment creditor.
It is apparent, therefore, that in the Bane case no weight should
be given to the fact that Wilson confessed the ten judgments in
favor of the bank. And, if those judgments were not void upon
jurisdictional grounds, for the reasons previously suggested, then
upon principle the court should have held that the Farmers Bank,
plaintiff and all other creditors of Wilson who would contribute to the costs of the plaintiff's suit, share equally and ratably
in the proceeds arising out of the sale of the land.
Secondly, the decision is opposed to the result reached in New
River Grocery Company v. Trent,2 7 which is strikingly similar upon its facts. There, the defendant, a retail merchant, was indebted
to Lewis, Hubbard & Company in the sum of $878.98, and also
owed other debts and was insolvent. Lewis, Hubbard & Company
split its claim into demands of $300 and under, in ordei to acquire
jurisdiction before a justice. Trent accepted service of the summonses and confessed judgments. The plaintiff, another creditor
of Trent's then filed suit in chancery charging that these
judgments had been secured with the intent to defraud Trent's
creditors. These allegations were taken for confessed and therefore admitted to be true. It was held that "Such charge or transfer
is not ipso facto void, but will be adjudged so if suit be brought by
a creditor within the time fixed by the statute, as this suit was
brought. Under the allegations of the bill, the judgments Trent
permitted to be obtained against him, (three by confession and one
by connivance and default) are by the statute declared 'void as to
such preference or security, but shall be taken to be for the benefit
of all creditors of such debtor.' " The result was that the claims
of the plaintiff and of Lewis, Hubbard & Company were paid pro
rata. The jurisdictional point was not discussed and apparently
not raised by counsel. Consequently, although the case may not be
2. 40 W. Va. 324, 21 S. E. 1012 (1895).
2652 W. Va. 499, 44 S. E. 257 (1903)).
27 101 W. Va. 118, 132 S. E. 487 (1926).
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a binding authority it is nevertheless persuasive and, in the absence of other authority, should have exerted a strong influence
upon the decision in the Bane case.
The upshot of the matter is that in the future in any case
of an insolvent debtor, the creditor whose claim exceeds $300 will
be driven into the circuit court in order to obtain a legitimate
judgment lien security for his claim. What, then, is the position
of the creditor of an insolvent debtor, who in the past has
obtained judgments before a justice upon a split cause of action
as defined in the Bane case? Suppose that those judgments are
more than one year old, or have been docketed in the county clerk's
office within eight months after rendition and no creditor's suit
attacking them has been filed within four months thereafter.28
The creditor, having been lulled into a feeling of safety and having
taken no further steps to obtain security by way of deed or deed
of trust, finds not only that he has no prior lien, budt that he cannot participate equally with a subsequent lienor, and for his pains
is relegated to the position of a common creditor.
Again, suppose that the judgment debtor were solvent at the
time when his creditor obtained judgments upon the split cause
of action. If valid, such judgments would constitute an immediate lien and unassailable within four months. The debtor
may continue to be solvent for several years thereafter. Yet, since
the judgments are void by the rule in the Bane case, they are complete nullities, and a less diligent creditor is preferred whether the
debtor remains solvent or subsequently becomes insolvent. The
field for attack upon such judgments and inquiry into the previous
status of the claim is opened wide. This would seem to be productive of litigation and tedious and expensive investigations before commissioners in chancery to whom judgment creditor's suits
have been referred for the ascertainment of liens and their priorities. The considerations of public policy which presumably gave
birth to the rule against splitting causes of action are thereby
confounded and rendered nugatory, and all this as the result of
the construction of a constitutional provision limiting the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. No remedy for the correction of
these untoward results suggests itself other than the overruling
of the Bane case or the adoption of a constitutional amendment.
28 Supra n. 24. In Nuzum v. Herron, supra n. 26, a quare was raised whether
attacking creditors must sue within four months after the docketing of the

pi eferential judgment.
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